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This study investigates how strategic tax transfer pricing of a multinational company (MNC)
and two tax authorities in different countries affects production and tax avoidance decisions at the
firm level and tax revenues at the country level. We employ a game-theoretical model to analyze
the costs and benefits of two tax transfer pricing regimes (consistency vs. inconsistency) under
asymmetric information. Though tax transfer pricing harmonization is considered a promising
instrument to fight undesired tax avoidance, the implications are largely unclear. We find tax
avoidance in equilibrium in both countries under inconsistency. Surprisingly, we identify conditions
under which low-tax countries benefit from consistency while high-tax countries benefit from
inconsistency. This explains how the strategic interaction of taxpayer and tax authorities under
firm-level heterogeneity challenges the implementation of consistent regimes. Understanding the
implications of (in)consistent transfer pricing rules is crucial when reforming transfer pricing
regulations to fight tax avoidance and double taxation.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This study investigates the effects of strategic transfer pricing of a multinational company (MNC)
and two tax authorities on production, profit, and tax avoidance at the firm level and tax revenues
at the country level. We employ a game-theoretical approach to examine the implications of
consistent and inconsistent transfer pricing. Tax transfer price inconsistencies are a consequence of
non-harmonized regulations across countries and differences in the interpretation and application of
the arm’s-length principle. Understanding the implications of more or less harmonized tax transfer
prices is important in face of current efforts towards uniform tax transfer prices across countries as
a way to fight base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) and prevent double taxation effectively.
As transfer pricing is one of the most important ways of profit shifting to low-tax countries
(Heckemeyer and Overesch, 2017), lately, intergovernmental forums like the OECD/G20 Inclusive
Framework on BEPS promote consistent transfer pricing standards. As a step towards this aim
and a uniform worldwide tax system, the OECD has already addressed the inconsistency issue in
BEPS Action 13 “Transfer Pricing Documentation and Country-by-Country Reporting” (OECD,
2015). The main idea is to harmonize transfer pricing documentation by implementing a three-tiered
standardized approach (master file, local file, country-by-country reports). The OECD expects that
enhanced documentation and exchange of information “requires taxpayers to articulate consistent
transfer pricing positions” (OECD, 2015, p. 9). Consistent tax transfer prices are expected to be
less vulnerable to profit shifting and to prevent double taxation. In addition, tax administrations are
expected to benefit from more information in a standardized, comparable, and thus useful format in
terms of increased compliance and tax revenues. But do countries indeed benefit from consistency?
What is the impact of transfer pricing consistency and inconsistency on MNCs’ real decisions such
as production decisions and in turn on MNCs’ profit? How does the transfer pricing regime affect
the incentives on allocation of functions and risks across divisions? In the light of present efforts to
curb harmful tax practices via tax regulation harmonization, providing answers to these questions is
imperative.
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A stylized example helps to illustrate the tension in these questions. If tax transfer pricing rules
are harmonized across a high-tax, importing country A and a low-tax, exporting country B to reduce
profit shifting from A to B, one might suspect that country B would not be interested in participating
in the harmonization project because it fears losing tax substrate as a consequence of generally
lower tax transfer prices. Surprisingly, our model suggests that under specific conditions the low-tax
country benefits from consistency even if this means accepting generally lower tax transfer prices
whereas it is the high-tax country that may suffer from tax revenue losses and puts itself at risk of
forgoing R&D investments. These results highlight that—due to the strategic interaction taking
place—the effects of introducing tax transfer pricing consistency are not straightforward but rather
deserve careful analysis.
Our analysis of the rational behavior of MNCs and tax authorities investigates both inconsistent
and consistent tax transfer pricing regimes under strategic interdependence of MNCs’ and tax
authorities’ actions. Based on this, we study the impact of the tax transfer pricing game on divisions’
incentives, MNCs’ optimal output and in turn the MNCs’ profit as well as on the countries’ tax
revenues.
Our study is motivated by four streams of literature. First, prior theoretical literature provides
a good understanding of inconsistent tax transfer pricing regimes being the result of a strategic
interaction between different countries (Elitzur et al. 1996; Mansori et al. 2001; Haufler et al. 2000;1
Møller et al. 2002). In line with these theoretical studies, inconsistent tax transfer pricing regulations
are observed empirically (Rathke, Rezende, and Watrin, 2020). Furthermore, anecdotal evidence
from semi-structured interviews and an online survey of transfer pricing experts we conducted in
2020 highlight the relevance of inconsistent transfer pricing.2
“So that also has nothing to do with what is an OECD country or not. This [transfer pricing inconsis-
tency] is an issue for all tax authorities.”
—Tax transfer pricing expert, German tax advisory firm.
1Even though Haufler and Schjelderup (2000) do not model transfer pricing explicitly, in their model countries
compete over tax rates and the extent of deductibility of investment costs. The latter determines the tax base and
thus is closely related and can be generalized to a transfer pricing setting.
2See Section II, as well as Appendix A.1, and A.2 for details.
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The above-mentioned theoretical studies abstract from strategic tax authorities’ behavior such as
an endogenous transfer pricing audit strategy.
In a second stream of literature, tax enforcement and how it affects MNC behavior receives more
attention. Horst (1971) studies MNC incentives in transfer pricing but abstracts from the costs of tax
planning. Other studies account for penalties and concealment costs (Kant, 1988; Choe and Hyde,
2007; Baumann and Friehe, 2013; Blouin, Robinson, and Seidman, 2018; Davies, Martin, Parenti,
and Toubal, 2018; Koethenbuerger, Mardan, and Stimmelmayr, 2019). However, the strategic
actions of tax authorities, which for example may endogenously adjust their behavior in response to
the MNC’s behavior, are not addressed in these studies.
Third and to the best of our knowledge, De Waegenaere, Sansing, and Wielhouwer (2006) is
the only study to investigate a setting with an MNC and two strategic tax authorities under tax
transfer price rule inconsistencies. Assuming that transfer price rule inconsistency occurs with a
specific probability, they find that tax authorities audit more heavily if the likelihood of inconsistency
increases. They find ambiguous effects of increasing transfer price rule inconsistency on taxpayer’s
expected tax liability as well as deadweight loss from auditing. The rationale behind their way of
modeling inconsistency is that both countries basically adhere to the (same) arm’s length standard.
They assume that a conflict on the allocation of tax income occurs with a specific probability leading
to different transfer prices. In contrast to their approach, we model inconsistency as the presence
of two distinct sets of rules for the two countries that do not necessarily have to be based on the
arm’s length principle. Therefore, our model also captures situations in which one country (e. g.,
Brazil) imposes tax transfer pricing rules that do not reflect the OECD’s notion of arm’s length
pricing. Furthermore, De Waegenaere et al. (2006) abstract from MNC reactions to increased
audit such as responses in output quantity (adjustment of production) that change the taxable profit.
Hence, we generalize their work by modelling MNC’s output decisions endogenously. In contrast
to De Waegenaere et al. (2006), who allow for only two types, we allow for a continuum of MNCs
characterized by different function and risk profiles. Moreover, not only does our model capture
transfer pricing inconsistencies emerging from differences at country level which, for example,
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materialize during an audit, we also allow for MNCs that have the opportunity to report different
transfer prices to the tax authorities. If regulations on the appropriate arm’s length price differ
among countries, logic dictates that honest MNCs report different tax transfer prices to the respective
tax authorities. This also reflects the conclusions we are able to draw from our survey evidence and
interviews:
“The answer is that a number of taxpayers differentiate and set a different transfer price in anticipation
of a discussion during the tax audit.”
—Transfer Pricing Partner, German tax advisory firm.
“You also have to see that of course the audit documents are sometimes different in the different
countries.”
—Transfer Pricing Expert, German Federal Central Tax Office.
Supported by this anecdotal evidence, we account for different reported tax transfer prices, i.e, we
assume that MNCs are allowed or required to file different tax transfer prices in the two countries.3
While prior theoretical studies that MNCs report one single transfer price to both tax authorities,
and that consistent (Horst, 1971; Kant, 1988; Haufler et al., 2000; Choe et al., 2007; Blouin et al.,
2018; Davies et al., 2018; Koethenbuerger et al., 2019) or inconsistent (De Waegenaere et al., 2006)
adaptions to the reported tax transfer prices emerge only later during tax negotiations and audits, we
model reported inconsistencies as a real-world phenomenon, which allows us to further enhance the
literature.
Fourth, we build on the theoretical model introduced by Baldenius, Melumad, and Reichelstein
(2004). They use a two-tier structure of an optimizing MNC and show that if taxes are taken into
consideration, a goal-congruent internal transfer price should exceed (be lower than) the marginal
cost of production if the maximum allowable tax transfer price is higher (lower) than the marginal
costs. While our focus is on tax transfer prices, we model the incentive structure via internal transfer
prices in line with Baldenius et al. (2004).4
3However, our model can also be generalized towards inconsistencies that arise during tax audits; see fn. 5, 6, and 8.
4There is also ample literature on whether multinationals should keep one or two sets of books (i. e., whether or not to
keep different transfer prices for internal incentive purposes and tax purposes) (see, e. g., Hyde and Choe, 2005;
Dürr and Göx, 2011). Instead, we assume that there are either two sets of books (allowing the foreign division to be
incentivized appropriately), or the MNCs headquarters has enough information to optimize profit on its own.
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We set up a game between a multinational company and two countries of residence, referred
to henceforth as “domestic” and “foreign.” We assume the domestic country is a high-tax country
while the foreign is low-tax. The MNC is informed about the functions, assets, and risk (FAR)
profile associated with the foreign division and the specific product, which determines the arm’s
length prices (both of which are country-specific in the case of inconsistent transfer pricing rules).
In a first stage, the MNC decides which quantity to produce. In a second stage, the MNC chooses
the tax transfer price reports including FAR profile reports (transfer pricing documentation) that
support this transfer price, given the country-specific transfer pricing rules.5
The tax authorities subsequently choose an audit probability conditional on the transfer pricing
documentation. We construct a separating equilibrium as first shown in a model on tax evasion
by Reinganum and Wilde (1986a). In our baseline setting we assume that transfer pricing rules
are inconsistent across the two countries, which implies that the MNC reports different transfer
prices to each country.6,7 In the next step, we modify the model to cover consistent tax transfer
pricing rules. Under transfer price consistency, the MNC reports a unique transfer price, i. e., the
MNC reports a uniform FAR profile that applies in both jurisdictions. In this case, the MNC is
5Our model is not limited to a scenario with reported transfer pricing differences but also covers settings with a
bargaining situation that occurs if a uniform tax transfer price were reported to both tax authorities but is challenged
by one or both tax authorities in an audit. As MNCs would anticipate the outcome of the negotiation when choosing
the production output, our analysis can be generalized to this setting. In this alternative interpretation of our model,
the production decision is identical, but the MNC reports a single (arbitrary) tax transfer price to both authorities.
6If we apply the alternative interpretation (uniformly reported transfer prices that are challenged in the tax audit,
ultimately leading to transfer pricing inconsistencies), tax authorities would always challenge the arbitrary single
tax transfer price reported beforehand. During the tax audit, a bargaining in the following sense would take place:
the MNC would propose a tax transfer price (which is identical to the “report” in the main text), which is rejected
by the respective tax authority with a probability that is identical to the “audit probability” in the baseline setting.
Rejecting the MNC’s proposition is costly for the respective tax authority because it requires justification of the
different assessment based on a FAR analysis. In this case, the tax authority can always enforce its judgement by
assumption. Based on the insights into the institutional process obtained via survey and expert interviews, this
seems an appropriate description of real-world situations. However, it would also be possible to assume that the tax
authority cannot always enforce its judgement, but rather the dispute is settled by a court, in which case either party
wins with an exogenously probability (c. f. Reinganum and Wilde, 1986b). We have not formally explored such an
extension and leave it to future research to enrich the model in this respect.
7This scenario can also be interpreted as a situation where tax transfer pricing systems are consistent but there is no
information exchange between the tax authorities.
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prevented from reporting differing tax transfer prices/FAR profiles because the uniform report is
made available to both tax authorities.8
We find that tax avoidance in equilibrium emerges in both countries under inconsistency. By
contrast, consistent transfer pricing regimes indirectly reduce tax avoidance in the high-tax country
through higher production and prevent tax avoidance in the low-tax country. Surprisingly, we
identify specific settings in which the high-tax country benefits from inconsistency while the
low-tax country benefits from consistency. Further, we find the profit-maximizing location of the
entrepreneurial function is highly parameter-dependent under both regimes. Under inconsistency,
the audit pressure is highest for firms with a hybrid functional profile, dampening their production
and reducing their after-tax profit under inconsistent transfer prices. Moreover, we obtain a goal-
congruent internal transfer price which accounts for strategically acting tax authorities. This result
is in line with Choe et al. (2007) who show how a goal-congruent internal transfer price needs to be
adjusted for expected (exogenous) penalties for misreporting.
Our contribution is threefold. First, we derive sufficient conditions for both consistency and
inconsistency being beneficial from the viewpoint of each country and identify settings in which
the two countries disagree on the implementation of consistent regimes. Second, we show the
relationship between an MNC’s FAR profile (i. e., the allocation of entrepreneurship) and its
production decision and profit, and which functional profiles are advantageous given consistency or
inconsistency. Finally, we confirm the main result of Choe et al. (2007) on the relationship between
(internal) incentive transfer price and tax transfer pricing (including penalties) in a more general
setting and show, that the goal congruent incentive transfer price is lower if tax transfer pricing rules
are consistent.
Our results on consistent and inconsistent tax transfer pricing suggest that transfer pricing
inconsistencies might not vanish in the short run.
8In the alternative interpretation, the ultimate outcome of the audit would need to be identical in both countries. E. g.,
this is the case if instruments like joint audit or mutual agreement procedures are in place.
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II. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
The fundamental principle of tax transfer pricing demands a remuneration for functions, assets, and
risks involved in the business, i. e., answering whether a group entity performs an entrepreneurial,
routine, or hybrid function. Usually, routine functions can be priced easily (at a low level) and the
entrepreneurial function results in a residual (high) income. Therefore, no matter which tax transfer
pricing method is applied, the determination of a subsidiary’s functions, assets, and risks is crucial
and determines the arm’s length price. Aside from the comparable uncontrolled price (CUP) method,
which is usually only applicable in the case of commodities, all remaining transfer pricing methods
are purely technical vehicles for implementing this fundamental principle. For example, in the case
of cost based pricing (resale minus), the mark-up (mark-down) depends on the FAR analysis (since
the database searches take into account the risk profile of comparable enterprises). The same is
true regarding the transactional net margin method (TNMM). When using the profit-split method,
which splits the combined profit on an economically valid basis, the FAR analysis is the only way to
determine this basis. Further, the choice of tax transfer pricing method depends on the FAR analysis.
Therefore, the tax authorities are not able to determine the arm’s length price of a given product
just by looking at its objective features. They have to conduct a costly in-depth audit of the FAR
analysis, i. e., they have to examine the functions performed, assets used, and risks assumed by the
different (producing or selling) units, which define the arm’s length price. The exact same product
can be assigned different arm’s length prices depending on how much risk is involved in producing
or selling it. Assume a product that is produced by one division in the foreign country and sold by
another division in the domestic country. Two contrasting extreme scenarios are imaginable. Either
the product was developed in the domestic country, all the risks are assumed there, and the unit in
the foreign country acts as a mere toll manufacturer.9 Or the product was developed in the foreign
country and the unit in the domestic country is only a distribution company.10 In the latter case the
9The tax transfer pricing method of choice in this case would be the cost plus method, and the price would result in
the costs plus a (risk and function adjusted) markup.
10The transfer pricing method of choice in this case would be the resale price method, and the price would result in the
resale price less a (risk and function adjusted) markdown.
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arm’s length price takes a value near the upper bound of possible transfer prices (sales price), while
in the former case it takes a value near the lower bound (production cost). If the functions, assets
and risks are distributed otherwise, the arm’s length price is located within this range (c. f. Figure
1).
While many countries basically adhere to the arm’s length standard as described above, the local
legal implementation differes among countries; also, some countries do not adhere to the arm’s
length principle at all (Rathke et al., 2020). Therefore, whenever local regulation produces different
tax transfer prices, consequently, MNCs would need to file different reports in those countries. This
may seem odd at first sight, as there is only one payment and invoice per transaction. Nevertheless,
it is possible to report different tax transfer prices. In the same way the tax transfer price is adjusted
ex post by only one country to a price above or below the actual payment (price on the invoice),
the taxpayer can make these (expectable) adjustments in advance (primary adjustments). In both
cases secondary transactions are usually carried out in order to make the actual allocation of profits
(actual payment) consistent with the primary adjustment; these often take the form of constructive
dividends, constructive equity contributions, or constructive loans (c. f. OECD, 2017, Glossary).
Imagine a company (country A) paying too high a price for a product from its subsidiary (country
B) from the viewpoint of country A; the primary adjustment of country A’s tax authorities would be
to disallow the expenses (equivalent to the difference between the actual price and the transfer price
of country A) and the secondary adjustment would be to requalify this difference as constructive
equity. Thus, it is possible to report tax transfer prices that differ from the actual payment without
committing fraud or tax evasion; in fact, knowing in advance that the countries’ arm’s length prices
differ, it is even necessary to do so.
Since previous literature assumes that taxpayers report just a single tax transfer price, we
conducted an online survey of transfer pricing practitioners and several expert interviews to back up
our deviation from the state of research with respect to this basic assumption. To obtain reliable
data we reached out to highly qualified and experienced senior tax managers in major German
multinational companies. The invitation to the survey was distributed via two channels. First, the
9
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Taxation Committee of the German Chemical Industry Association11 distributed the link to more
than 20 tax managers of multinational companies in the chemical industry which represent about
30 percent of the DAX companies, as well as several M-DAX companies and multinational family
businesses. Second, we distributed the survey via the Transfer Pricing working group of the German
Consortium for Economic Management,12 which covers all industries. In total, 45 individuals
participated anonymously in our survey, 23 of whom fully completed the survey.13 Of these, 82.6
percent indicated that they have worked at least ten years in the field of tax transfer pricing, while
the majority stated they had worked in this area for more than 15 years. Most hold a Master’s degree
(or equivalent), 26.1 percent even a PhD (or equivalent). On average, they report spending roughly
70 percent of their working time on tax transfer pricing. Based on this information we conclude
that the statements made by the participants provide a valid picture of the reporting behavior of
the respective companies. 78.3 percent of the participants stated that they have reported different
tax transfer prices in two countries (43.5 percent stated this occurs occasionally or more often),
which supports our conjectures. Also, we conducted six semi-structured expert interviews with
representatives of multinational companies, tax advisory firms (Big4), and the German Federal
Central Tax Office (Bundeszentralamt für Steuern, BZSt)14 that further corroborate the real-world
relevance of both transfer pricing regime inconsistency and inconsistencies in transfer pricing
reports.
III. INCONSISTENT TAX TRANSFER PRICING RULES
The first part of our model set-up follows Baldenius et al. (2004) and Choe et al. (2007). We consider
a multinational with a headquarters (HQ) and divisions in two countries referred to as “domestic”
11German: Verband der Chemischen Industrie e.V. (VCI).
12The German Consortium for Economic Management (Arbeitsgemeinschaft für wirtschaftliche Verwaltung e.V.) is a
non-profit association funded by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy. The purpose of the
association is to improve business-to-government (B2G) relationships. The Transfer Pricing working group prepares
issues of international tax law with reference to transfer pricing with close practical relevance, and scrutinizes and
comments on current developments and discusses and exchanges experiences on recent development in transfer
pricing.
13For an overview, refer to Table 1 in Appendix A.1
14See Appendix A.2.
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and “foreign,” given a setting with two sets of books. The foreign division produces an intermediary
product of quantity q at constant marginal costs of production c which is sold in the domestic
country.15 The domestic division earns revenue R(q) with R′(q)> 0 and R′′(q)< 0.16 The tax rate
in the foreign country is given by τ f whereas the tax rate in the domestic country is denoted by τd .
In the following, we assume that τd > τ f . Since the HQ is not aware of R(q), the domestic division
(which is informed) needs to be incentivized appropriately using an internal transfer price (e. g.,
Baldenius et al., 2004), denoted by s. Given s, the domestic division then chooses the optimal output
q.17 When making the production decision, the MNC is informed about the arm’s length price18
that is correct from the viewpoint of domestic and foreign jurisdiction, respectively, according to
the FAR profile. This well-known procedure is referred to as Stage 1.
The subsequent game between the MNC and both tax authorities is called Stage 2. In the next
step, the HQ submits its reports on taxable income accompanied by appropriate tax transfer pricing
documentation that support the chosen tax transfer prices to the tax authorities. The transfer pricing
documentation informs the tax authorities about the (reported) tax transfer prices and quantity
q.19 In case of inconsistent transfer pricing rules, multinationals are required to prepare individual
documentation for both countries, each addressing the legal specifics. This opens up the possibility
to individually optimize the reports to an extent that is justifiable within the uncertainties and
15If the foreign division also sells intermediary products of quantity q f in the foreign market, earning R f (q f ), the
optimal quantity would be determined by the condition R′f (q f ) = c. The optimal internal or tax transfer prices
would not be affected (Choe et al., 2007). Thus, in order to keep the notation simple, we ignore this case in the
following analysis.
16In detail, see Assumption 1.
17We study a decentralized setting (i. e., decentralized with respect to the choice of quantity). However, our results also
hold when regarding a centralized setting. In this case, headquarters would directly choose the optimal quantity.
18Below, the term “arm’s length price” is used to describe the tax transfer price implied by the “true” FAR profile
in compliance with the law of the respective country. By contrast, the term “reported transfer price” is the price
implied by the reported FAR profile (which is not necessarily the true FAR profile). That is, the multinational
chooses to report a particular FAR profile that supports the chosen transfer price, while the respective tax authority
identifies the “true” FAR profile which then leads to the arm’s length price.
19Action 13 of OECD’s BEPS action plan develops a three-tiered standardized approach to transfer pricing documenta-
tion. Tier two “requires that detailed transactional transfer pricing documentation be provided in a “local file”
specific to each country, identifying material related party transactions, the amounts involved in those transactions,
and the company’s analysis of the transfer pricing determinations they have made with regard to those transactions”
(OECD, 2015, p. 9). Still, if the transfer pricing requirements of a particular country do not comply with the cited
OECD-requirements, the tax authorities can observe the quantity, for example, through VAT returns. Since VAT
returns are submitted on a monthly basis, tax authorities should be aware of the quantity prior to a potential audit.
Even more easily, the quantity can be learned from the multinational’s profit and loss statement.
11
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3895611
interpretative discretion that are inherent in any legal system. That is, in contrast to prior literature
(e. g., Baldenius et al., 2004; De Waegenaere et al., 2006; Choe et al., 2007), but as a direct
consequence of inconsistent transfer pricing rules, we allow for the multinational to report different
tax transfer prices to the tax authorities of the respective jurisdictions. Still, the MNC’s position
may be rejected in an audit. While the tax authorities are not able to determine the arm’s length
price of a given product just by looking at its obvious features, they can conduct a costly in-depth
audit of the FAR analysis, i. e., they can examine the functions performed, risks assumed, and assets
used by the different (producing or selling) units, which determine the arm’s length price. In this
case, deviations from the arm’s length standard may incur penalties (e. g., Choe et al., 2007; Blouin
et al., 2018; Davies et al., 2018; Koethenbuerger et al., 2019).
Arm’s length prices in country i are denoted by pi, where i ∈ {d, f} refers to the domestic and
foreign country, respectively; they are distributed on the interval [pi, pi] according to the probability
density function fi(pi).20 In accordance with common transfer price regulations we assume that
pi ≥ c. Low arm’s length prices which are close to pi emerge and are appropriate if the foreign
division has a routine function; they are typically a result of cost-based pricing rules. By contrast,
high arm’s length prices close to pi typically emerge from a resale price minus method and are
applied if the foreign division has an entrepreneurial function, leaving the domestic division with a
routine function (e. g., distribution unit). Consequently, intermediate pi-values generally point to a
hybrid functional profile of both divisions (Figure 1).21
Figure 1 about here
The firm’s reported transfer price in the domestic country td = rd(pd), and in the foreign country
t f = r f (p f ), respectively, is a function of the observed arm’s length prices.
20Without loss of generality, we abstract from the fact that in reality there may be an interval of accepted tax transfer
prices rather than a single arm’s length price. If there were a range of feasible arm’s length prices, the multinational
would always report at the upper or lower boundary (Baldenius et al., 2004; Choe et al., 2007). Namely, the
multinational would report at the upper boundary in the domestic country and at the lower boundary in the foreign
country. Therefore, fd(pd) can be thought of as a distribution of upper boundaries and f f (p f ) as a distribution of
lower boundaries.
21This could also be formalized by making pi dependent on cost and resale price: pi = (1− γi)c+ γiR(q)/q. For a
stylized solution of the second stage see Appendix D.
12
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The domestic tax authority audits with probability ad(td). Since τd > τ f , the multinational’s
headquarters has an incentive to report a high transfer price td in order to shift profits to the foreign
low-tax country. To avoid taxes in the foreign country, in turn, the multinational wants to report a
low transfer price r f (p f ), facing an audit probability a f (t f ). If the tax authority disagrees during an
audit, we assume a linear penalty, that is, θd ≥ 1 (domestic country) or θ f ≥ 1 (foreign country)
times the underpaid tax (Yitzhaki, 1974).22 Following Choe et al. (2007) we assume that the
subsequent payment of taxes including penalties is divided between the domestic division and the
multinational’s headquarters, with headquarters’ bargaining power denoted by ν ,ν ∈ [0,1]. ν = 1
indicates that the domestic division has to bear the total subsequent payment whereas ν = 0 implies
that headquarters bears the full amount. As noted by Choe et al. (2007), it is necessary to make
the domestic division bear a share of the penalty even though it is not in control of rd(pd). This is
because the domestic division is in control of q, which in turn is has an impact on the penalty. As
described above, with inconsistent transfer pricing rules, tax avoidance may emerge in the foreign
country too. The foreign division, however, is in control of neither q nor r f (p f ). Thus, it is not
necessary to make the foreign division bear a share of possible subsequent (penalty) payments.
The foreign division’s after-tax profit is given by
Π f = (s− c)q− τ f (r f (p f )− c)q (1)
and the domestic division’s after-tax profit is given by
Πd = (1− τd)R(q)− sq+ τdrd(pd)q−νad(rd(pd))θdτd (rd(pd)− pd)q. (2)
The structure of the penalty component (last term) is highly relevant to our analysis. Choe et
al. (2007) represent the expected penalty by an exogenously given convex function which takes
22We introduce a penalty for the sake of generality; in many countries, reported transfer prices which differ from the
respective arm’s length prices are simply corrected by the tax authorities without incurring a penalty. This can be
captured by setting θd and/or θ f equal to 1; our results do not change qualitatively in these cases. Even if there is no
penalty, the correction may take place several years after the initial transaction. Then, θd −1 and θ f −1 can be
interpreted as interest rates.
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underpaid tax as the only argument. As they are not interested in the strategic relationship between
multinational and tax authority, they abstract from the fact that a penalty only arises after an audit
has taken place. Here, we specify the expected penalty component as detection probability times
the penalty due, where the detection probability (audit function) is determined endogenously.
The multinational’s total after-tax income is given by
Π(rd,r f ,ad,a f ) = R(q)− cq− τd (R(q)−qrd(pd))− τ f
(
r f (p f )− c
)
q
−ad(td)θdτdq(rd(pd)− pd)−a f (t f )θ f τ f q
(
p f − r f (p f )
)
. (3)
Finally, the domestic and foreign tax authorities’ expected net tax revenues are given by
Td(td,ad,µd) = τd(R(q)− tdq)+ad(td)τdθd(td−µd(td))q− kd(ad(td)) (4)
Tf (t f ,a f ,µ f ) = τ f q(t f − c)+a f (t f )τ f θ f q(µ f (t f )− t f )− k f (a f (t f )), (5)
where ki(ai) with k′i > 0,k
′′
i ≥ 0 denotes the audit costs, and µi(ti) is the belief about the arm’s length
price pi upon observing a report ti of tax authority i (see the following subsection). It is standard
in the literature on tax transfer pricing to assume that the government maximizes net tax revenues
(Graetz, Reinganum, and Wilde, 1986; Reinganum et al., 1986a; Beck and Jung, 1989; Mills and
Sansing, 2000; Sansing, 1993; Elitzur and Mintz, 1996; Mansori and Weichenrieder, 2001; De
Waegenaere et al., 2006; De Waegenaere, Sansing, and Wielhouwer, 2007). Also, it is common to
assume that the penalty is part of the tax authorities’ revenues (e. g., Graetz et al., 1986; Beck et al.,
1989). However, the results of our model would not change qualitatively, when assuming that the
tax authorities do not benefit from the penalty payment.23
Figure 2 depicts the timing of the game and Figure 3 shows the game tree.
Figure 2 about here
ASSUMPTION 1. The revenue function R(q) satisfies
23In this case, θi would be set to one in the tax authorities’ objective functions but remain in the MNC’s objective
function.
14
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Figure 3 about here
















Condition a) is a standard assumption. Conditions b) and c) are curvature conditions that ensure
the MNC’s profit function is globally concave. Condition c) is made for the sake of mathematical
convenience; it is a sufficient but not necessary condition for global concavity of the MNC’s profit
function and can therefore be relaxed depending on the chosen revenue function and on chosen
parameters.
Second Stage
The game is solved via backwards induction. In the second stage of the game, the multinational
and both tax authorities strategically determine reported tax transfer prices ti = ri(pi) and the audit
probabilities ai(ti),24 both depending on the quantity q.
For this kind of game, there exists a separating equilibrium which was first shown by Reinganum
et al. (1986a; 1986b) and used to study tax evasion and tax avoidance by Reinganum et al. (1986a),
Erard and Feinstein (1994), and Diller and Lorenz (2015). As noted in these analyses, also pooling
and partially pooling equilibria emerge. While Erard et al. (1994) show that (partially) pooling
equilibria can be ruled out by introducing a portion of “honest” taxpayers that always report their
true income, Reinganum et al. (1986b) show that (partially) pooling equilibria do not survive the
universally divine equilibrium concept introduced by Banks and Sobel (1987). In Appendix E we
elaborate on possible (partially) pooling equilibria and show that they can be ruled out by applying
the universally divine equilibrium concept. Furthermore, pooling would require that MNCs also
24These audit probabilities can be thought of as the tax authorities imposing a specific effort in investigating the transfer
price report. Higher effort is then associated with a higher probability of detecting an error. See also Reinganum
et al. (1986a, p. 742). Henceforth, ad(td) and a f (t f ) are referred to as “audit probabilities” or “audit functions.”
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choose the optimal production level of the type they imitate, since production quantities are visible
to the tax authorities. We therefore focus on the separating equilibrium.
Upon observing a reported transfer price ti the tax authority i needs to be equipped with a belief
concerning the arm’s length price associated with this report. Since we are interested in a separating
equilibrium, we define point beliefs: Upon observing ti the tax authorities’ prior estimation of the
arm’s length price is given by µi(ti).
We define a separating equilibrium as established by Reinganum et al. (1986a):
DEFINITION 1. Between the multinational and tax authority i, a separating equilibrium is given
by a triple (µi(ti),ai(ti),ri(pi)) such that
a) ai(ti) maximizes Ti, given the beliefs µi(ti);
b) ri(p) maximizes Π, given the audit probability ai(td);
c) The tax authorities’ beliefs correspond to the multinational’s equilibrium strategy: µi(ti) =
ri−1(ti) = pi.
Note that the consistency requirement c) involves that in equilibrium the tax authorities in both
countries can infer the arm’s length price after observing the reported transfer price. Thus, they
aware that profit shifting exists even without auditing. It has been noted that this feature of the
separating equilibrium may seem odd (Erard et al., 1994). Keep in mind, however, that claiming
back taxes (and possibly imposing an additional penalty) requires providing proof. Hence, the tax
authorities still need to perform a costly audit even though they know beforehand that reported
taxable income is too low from their perspective. For expositional clarity we develop the model for
linear audit costs ki(ai) = biai, i. e., tax authority i’s marginal audit cost is given by bi.
PROPOSITION 1. In a game between the domestic tax authority and the multinational, a separat-
ing equilibrium is given by the following strategies and beliefs:
16
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a) The domestic tax authority audits with probability
ad(td) =










td ≤ td ≤ td
1 td > td
;
b) the multinational reports




c) the equilibrium and out-of-equilibrium beliefs are given by
µd(td) =

pd td ≤ td
rd(pd) td ≤ td ≤ td
pd td > td
,
where td = pd +
bd
τdθdq




Proof. See Appendix B.1.
The game between the MNC and the foreign tax authority is inverse in the sense that the MNC
tries to push the tax transfer price down instead of up. As a consequence, the foreign audit function
is sloped downwards instead of upwards.
PROPOSITION 2. In a game between the foreign tax authority and the multinational, a separating
equilibrium is given by the following strategies and beliefs:
17
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a) The foreign tax authority audits with probability
a f (t f ) =






θ f τ f q
b f
(p f−t f )
)
t f ≤ t f ≤ t f
0 t f ≥ t f
;
b) the multinational reports
r f (p f ) = p f −
b f
τ f θ f q
;
c) the equilibrium and out-of-equilibrium beliefs are given by
µ f (t f ) =

p f t f < t f
r f (p f ) t f ≤ t f ≤ t f
p f t f ≥ t f
.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
Propositions 1 c) and 2 c) imply that the domestic (foreign) tax authority believes that any report
td < td (t f > t f ) comes from type pd (p f ) (cf. Reinganum et al., 1986a).25
If the equilibrium tax transfer price reports rd,r f given by Propositions 1 b) and 2 b) are inserted
into the equilibrium audit functions given by Propositions 1 a) and 2 a), both functions directly
depend on pi. For notational convenience, we write ainci (pi) ≡ ai(td); throughout this paper, we
25For details concerning the derivation of this kind of separating equilibrium, see also Reinganum et al. (1986b) and
Erard et al. (1994). Erard et al. (1994) note that if the audit costs were to decrease or increase slightly after the
report was filed, the tax authority would alter its strategy to audit either all or no taxpayers. This characteristic does
not arise, however, when including a budget constraint for the tax authority (as introduced by Erard et al., 1994), or
when audit costs are assumed to be strictly convex (as shown by Reinganum et al., 1986a).
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Figure 4 about here
use the superscript inc (con) to indicate optimal values for the inconsistency (consistency) setting.
Figure 4 depicts the audit functions depending on the arm’s length price pi.26
The following lemma is straightforward and follows directly from inserting the equilibrium
reporting policies into the equilibrium audit functions as stated in Propositions 1 and 2 and taking











Both tax authorities increase their audit efforts with increasing quantity, which is an intuitive
result since both tax and penalty revenue depend on the volume of production whereas the audit cost
is fixed. However, when regarding the equilibrium reports, it becomes evident that an increasing
production volume reduces the extent of profit shifting in both countries.
First Stage
Given the equilibrium of the second stage of the game as shown in Propositions 1 and 2, the
domestic division’s problem in the first stage is to choose the quantity such as to maximize
Π
inc
d (q) = R(q)− sq− τd (R(q)−qrd(pd))−νa
inc
d θdτdq(rd(pd)− pd)




This produces the first-order condition
∂Πincd (q)
∂q
= (1− τd)R′(q)+ pdτd−bdν
∂aincd
∂q
− s = 0. (7)
Intuitively, the marginal after-tax revenues plus the marginal tax savings has to equate the marginal
incentive transfer price plus the share of the marginal expected penalty. Headquarters, however,
26Notice that the audit functions also depend on q, which is determined in the following subsection. The graphs shown
in Figure 4 account for this dependence.
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Note that—given the equilibrium in the second stage of the game—the MNC’s gain from profit
shifting equals bd
θd
in the domestic country and b f
θ f
in the foreign country. If audited, the MNC’s fine
corresponds exactly to the respective tax authority’s audit cost.
Maximizing with respect to q gives the first-order condition
∂Πinc(q)
∂q











In the first stage, headquarters sets the incentive transfer price such as to make the domestic division
choose q according to its own first-order condition. The incentive transfer price that achieves goal
congruence between the domestic division and headquarters is found by setting equal (7) and (9):27







The last two terms of the optimal incentive transfer price account for the marginal penalty in both
countries. As shown in Lemma 1, the derivatives of the audit rates with respect to the quantity are
positive but decreasing. As described by Choe et al. (2007) the domestic division would choose
too high a quantity were it not responsible for potential costs of tax avoidance. To account for
this effect, headquarters needs to increase the incentive transfer price in order to reach an overall
optimal outcome. As for the marginal penalty in the domestic country, if the domestic division were
to bear the whole penalty (i. e., ν = 1), the multinational would not have to increase the incentive
transfer price to prevent the domestic division from ordering too much. For 0 < ν < 1, headquarters
will increase the incentive transfer price with a decreasing share of penalty borne by the domestic
27This procedure is well established in the literature, see, e. g., Hirshleifer (1956).
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division. This confirms the finding of Choe et al. (2007) in a more general setting. In contrast to
Choe et al. (2007), however, we find that this penalty related markup on the internal transfer price
decreases with increasing quantity since ∂
2ainci
∂q2 < 0 (c. f. Lemma 1). The differing result in Choe
et al. (2007) is driven by the (exogenous) convex penalty function assumed there. Furthermore,
since the domestic division is not responsible for penalties charged by the foreign tax authority,
headquarters has to increase the incentive transfer price to make the domestic division account for
the whole share of the marginal penalty so the division is prevented from ordering too much.
If headquarters sets a goal-congruent incentive transfer price, the optimal quantity denoted by
qinc satisfies both (7) and (9). Note from (9) that MNC’s first-order condition would be identical in
a setting without profit shifting except for the two last terms that capture the marginal cost of an
audit. That is, since the gain from profit shifting is constant, it does not enter the MNC’s calculus
when determining the optimal output. The MNC has to take into account the audit probabilities,
however, which increase in q.







+(1− τd)R′′(q)≤ 0. (11)









f (p f−p f )2
b f
≤−(1− τd)R′′(0) (“condition a)”). Given q = 0, condition a) is necessary and suffi-
cient for the extreme case pd = pd∧ p f = p f and sufficient ∀{pd ∈ [pd, pd]∧ p f ∈ (p f , p f ]}Y{pd ∈











f (p f−p f )
3e
qθ f τ f (p f−p f )
b f
b2f
+(1− τd)R′′′(q) ≤ 0. Note that the fractions
are negative. Therefore, this condition is fulfilled since, by part c) of Assumption 1, R′′′(q) ≤ 0
(“condition b)”). Condition b) is sufficient. E. g., for the simple revenue function R(q) = q(k− lq/2),














/(1− τd)< l, and condition b) is always
fulfilled.
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III.1. Relationship between FAR Profile and Firm Level Decisions
To discuss the relationship between the arm’s length price and the optimal quantity as well as the
MNC’s profit we have to focus on the relationship between pd and p f . Since the foreign country’s
tax base increases in p f , it generally has an incentive to create tax transfer price regulations that
lead to higher arm’s length prices (e. g., Mansori et al., 2001). However, while the regimes are
inconsistent, it seems reasonable to assume that higher arm’s length prices in the domestic country
tend to coincide with higher arm’s length prices in the foreign country. We capture this idea by
making the following
ASSUMPTION 2. With inconsistent transfer pricing rules, the foreign tax arm’s length prices are
generally higher than the domestic arm’s length prices: p f = pd +δ , where δ ≥ 0.
Assumption 2 can be interpreted as caputuring the case where both countries basically adhere to
the arm’s length principle. By contrast, completely independent pd and p f reflect a situation where
one country (e. g., Brazil) or both countries use a transfer pricing system which is not based on the
arm’s length principle. We show the results for this case (i. e., when relaxing Assumption 2) in
Appendix C. To simplify the notation, we write p≡ pd (thus, p f = p+δ ) below where possible.28
PROPOSITION 3. If transfer pricing rules are inconsistent and the foreign arm’s length price is
given by p f = p+δ ,
a) the optimal quantity decreases in p for (low) arm’s length prices close to p and increases in
p for (high) arm’s length prices close to p, and
b) the MNC’s profit is convex in the arm’s length price p with an interior minimum at p̌ that
satisfies τdθdaincd (p̌) = τ f θ f a
inc
f (p̌);
28Note that, since the transfer pricing regimes are legally inconsistent, it is necessary for the MNC to submit individual
transfer pricing documentation. We assume that the foreign tax authority is not aware of the documentation
submitted to the domestic tax authority (e. g., lack of information exchange), and/or the domestic documentation is
not usable by the foreign tax authority because of the inconsistent regimes. Otherwise, if the foreign tax authority
were perfectly informed about the reports submitted in both countries as well as about the relationship between
domestic and foreign rules, the foreign tax authority could infer p f = pd +δ upon observing td , which would force
the MNC to report t f = td +δ in the foreign country, and, as a consequence, the foreign tax authority would stop
auditing. If this is the case, the transfer pricing regimes are quasi consistent and therefore the results obtained in
Section IV apply analogously.
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Figure 5 about here
c) both optimal quantity and MNC’s profit decrease if arm’s length prices in the foreign country
are generally increased (i. e., if δ is increased).
Proof. See Appendix B.2.
Intuitively, if p is close to p, the domestic audit function disappears and the foreign audit function
approaches a value close to 1
θ f
. As p increases, the domestic audit function increases rather fast,
whereas the foreign audit function decreases rather slowly (Figure 4). Therefore, overall audit
pressure increases along with p in the proximity of p, and, accordingly, quantity decreases. The
same is true vice versa for arm’s length prices close to p. As a second effect, however, higher arm’s
length prices allow for more tax deductions in the domestic (high-tax) country; because of this
tax shield, quantity by trend increases with increasing arm’s length prices. Therefore, generally,





stylized example displayed in Figure 5 below suggests that production reaches a global minimum
for a rather low arm’s length price, a global maximum is given for the highest arm’s length price
p = p, and there is no internal local maximum.29
As to Proposition 3 b), note that in a model with (only) honest reporting, profit increases linearly
with the arm’s length price at a rate of Π“honesty”p = q(τd− τ f ). In our model, the changing audit
probabilities have to be taken into account. Intuitively, audit pressure is highest for divisions with a
hybrid functional profile, which dampens profits. A hybrid functional profile implies that p is neither
close to p nor p. From the viewpoint of the domestic tax authority, if p is high (i. e., the difference
to p is large), the exponential term in the domestic tax authority’s audit function approaches zero
and therefore the audit probability approaches its maximum at 1
θd
, whereas, from the viewpoint
of the foreign tax authority, if the difference between p and p is large, the audit rate approaches
its maximum at 1
θ f
. Hence, if the difference of p to both p and p is large, which implies a hybrid
functional profile, both tax authorities audit with a high probability, which dampens MNC’s profit.
29This shape is not general, however. E. g., if the tax rate differential is small enough, q reaches a local maximum at an
intermediate arm’s length price.
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Notably, profit is lowest in case of a hybrid FAR profile. That is, if MNCs are able to choose
the (actual) FAR allocation,30 they would prefer to allocate the entrepreneurial FAR completely
to the foreign country. As the profit is convex in the arm’s length price, this incentive increases if
most entrepreneurial FAR are already allocated there. If some need to be allocated in the domestic
country for non-tax reasons, MNC may prefer a complete allocation in the domestic country over a
hybrid allocation.
Proposition 3 c) is not surprising, as c. p. higher arm’s length prices in the foreign country (i. e.,
higher δ ) always represent higher marginal costs and thus lower quantity and lower profit.
IV. CONSISTENT TAX TRANSFER PRICING RULES
In this section we assume that transfer pricing rules are consistent among the two countries, namely,
pd = p f ≡ p, fd(·) = f f (·) ≡ f (·). This implies that multinationals have to submit identical tax
transfer pricing documentation to both countries.31 If a multinational reports different transfer
prices td 6= t f in both jurisdictions, it is evident that at least one of the reports is incorrect. While the
equilibrium of the inconsistency setting involves that the tax authorities are aware of the amount
of profit shifting, the tax authorities still need to perform a costly audit to provide proof regarding
the true arm’s length price. Here, a firm that reports two different prices where there is only one
“true” price incriminates itself.32 Thus, as part of an equilibrium, the multinational will report a
common tax transfer price td = t f ≡ t. Since τd > τ f by assumption, the multinational will report
t > p in order to shift profits to the low-tax country. The foreign tax authority anticipates this
and consequently never audits. Therefore, it is sufficient to search for an equilibrium in a game
between the MNC and the domestic tax authority as described in Definition 1. The construction of
30Recall that the actual FAR allocation determines the arm’s length price pi.
31When assuming that there is an accepted interval rather than one correct arm’s length price (see footnote 20), the
MNC would choose to report at the upper boundary of an accepted interval, as τd > τ f . Consequently, f (p) can be
interpreted as a distribution of upper boundaries.
32Formally, this could be implemented by integrating a penalty that occurs with probability one whenever td 6= t f . As
long as the marginal penalty from reporting different transfer prices is higher than the marginal tax savings from
profit shifting, the multinational will always report a common transfer price. This is always the case as long as the
marginal penalty is higher than the marginal tax rate.
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the equilibrium is analogous to the inconsistency setting. For convenience, we omit the subscripts
that refer to the domestic country where possible, i. e., we write a(t),θ ,b instead of ad(t),θd,bd .
Second Stage
In the second stage of the game the MNC chooses its report t = r(p) to maximize
Π(r,a) = R(q)− cq− τd (R(q)−qr(p))− τ f (t− c)q−a(t)θτdq(r(p)− p) . (12)
The domestic tax authority’s objective function is quite similar to (4). With constant marginal audit
costs, one has
Td(t,a,µ) = τd(R(q)− tq)+a(t)τdθ(t−µ(t))q−a(t)b, (13)
where in the setting with consistent transfer pricing regimes we denote with µ(t) the domestic tax
authority’s (point-)belief upon observing t.
PROPOSITION 4. Given consistent transfer pricing regimes, in a game between the domestic tax
authority and the multinational, a separating equilibrium is given by the following strategies and
beliefs:
a) The domestic tax authority audits with probability
a(t) =









t ≤ t ≤ t
1 t > t
;
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c) the equilibrium and out-of-equilibrium beliefs are given by
µ(t) =

p t ≤ t
r(p) t ≤ t ≤ t
p t > t
,
where t = p+ b
θτdq
and t = p+ b
θτdq
.
Proof. The proof of Proposition 4 is analogous to the proof of Proposition 1 shown in Appendix B.1.
Again, by inserting p = µ(t) as determined from the domestic tax authority’s first-order condition
obtained from (13) into the MNC’s first-order condition obtained from (12), together with the
boundary condition a(t) = 0, one obtains the differential equation shown in Proposition 4 a).
Note that r(p) is also reported to the foreign tax authority, implying a tax overpayment in the
foreign jurisdiction. Again we write acon(p)≡ a(t). Somewhat surprisingly, although any profit
that is shifted to the foreign country is taxed at τ f , the level of profit shifting does not depend on the
foreign tax rate. However, the audit function depends on the tax rate differential. If the foreign tax
rate increases (or the domestic tax rate decreases), the probability of an audit decreases. That is, the
domestic tax authority can maintain the same level of profit shifting with less audit activity. The
audit rate vanishes as the tax rate differential approaches zero. For τd = τ f the tax authority never
audits; however, the equilibrium no longer holds in this case, for profit shifting is simply no longer
beneficial.
First Stage and Relationship between FAR Profile and Firm Level Decisions
Inserting acon and r(p) from Proposition 4 into (12) one obtains
Π
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Differentiating with respect to q delivers the first-order condition for an optimal quantity of output
in the first stage:
∂Πcon(q)
∂q




− τ f (p− c)−baconq = 0, (15)
where the subscript q denotes the respective partial derivative. The domestic division, however,
orders a quantity of products from the foreign division such as to maximize
Π
con
d (q) = R(q)− sq− τd(R(q)−qr(p))−νa
con
θτdq(r(p)− p)




which gives the first-order condition R′(q)(1− τd)+ pτd − νbaconq − s = 0. Goal congruence is
achieved by setting
scon = (1− τ f )c+ τ f p f +(1−ν)baconq . (17)
Let qcon denote the solution to (15). The second-order condition is given by
S≡ (1− τd)R(q)′′−bdaconqq ≤ 0. (18)
If R(q) is chosen such that the second-order condition for the inconsistency setting holds (i. e., given
Assumption 1), (18) is fulfilled as well.33
PROPOSITION 5. With consistent transfer pricing regimes,











b) MNC’s profit is convex in the arm’s length price with a maximum at p = p.
33At q = 0, we have
θτd(p−p)2(τd−τ f )
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Proof. See Appendix B.3.
The gray line in Figure 5 (left-hand side) depicts the evolution of q as p increases. While higher
arm’s length prices (more entrepreneurial functions in the foreign country) are associated with
higher audit probabilities in the domestic jurisdiction, they also allow for higher tax deductions in
the domestic country, which reduces the marginal (tax-related) cost of production and thus induces
the multinational to increase its output.
The same reasoning applies to the MNC’s profit generated in equilibrium (Proposition 5 b)). As
profit increases with an increasing entrepreneurial function in the foreign country, MNCs have an
incentive to allocate these functions in the foreign country. Since the relationship is convex, the
more entrepreneurial functions are already localized in the foreign country, the more this incentive
increases (Figure 5, right-hand side).
V. EFFECTS OF CONSISTENT TAX TRANSFER PRICING RULES
In investigating the effects of consistency, we focus on the case where Assumption 2 holds and
therefore pd ≡ p, p f = p+δ : Comparing a setting with identical arm’s length prices to a setting
with completely independent arm’s length prices delivers little insight because there exists an infinite
number of combinations of pd and p f .
Figures 4 and 5 suggest that consistent transfer pricing rules lead to a higher volume of produc-
tion and are thus preferable from the viewpoint of both tax authorities because the domestic tax
authority’s audit costs are much lower and the foreign tax authority has no audit costs at all since it
never audits. However, the graphs show the equilibrium for exemplarily chosen parameters. The
depicted context may thus not be general. For example, the audit function for consistent transfer
pricing is reduced by the tax rate differential in the numerator. However, according to Lemma 1, it
increases with increasing quantity. Since the quantity may be higher in the consistency setting, the
overall effect is unclear. In the following, we analyze how quantity, audit rates, profit, and expected
net tax revenues change after introducing consistent transfer pricing rules.
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Decisions at Firm Level
PROPOSITION 6. Compared to the setting with inconsistent tax transfer pricing rules, with
consistent tax transfer pricing rules
a) the MNC produces more output for any arm’s length price;
b) tax avoidance is reduced;
c) the MNC sets a lower incentive transfer price.
Proof. Part a): see Appendix B.4; parts b) and c): see below.
Intuitively, with inconsistent transfer pricing rules, the multinational needs to account for the
marginal audit probability in both countries, whereas with consistent transfer pricing rules only the
domestic marginal audit probability enters the multinational’s calculus. While the MNC benefits
from inconsistency as it can individually optimize the transfer price report in both countries, this
gain is constant and therefore is not taken into account when choosing the optimal output.
As described above, the multinational needs to report a common transfer price in the consistency
setting. Thus, there is no more tax avoidance in the foreign country and consequently the foreign tax
authority will stop auditing. In the domestic country, the multinational overreports the transfer price
by bd/(θdτdqcon). While the structure of this formula is similar to the inconsistency setting, the
transfer price will be overstated by less since the quantity in the consistency setting qcon is higher
than the quantity qinc in the inconsistency setting, according to Proposition 6 a).
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First, with consistent tax transfer pricing (right-hand side), it is not necessary to account for the
marginal penalty in the foreign country, which reduces the internal price. Second, marginal penalties
decrease with increasing quantity (Lemma 1). Therefore, as quantity is higher with consistent tax








side). Finally, the derivative with respect to q of the domestic tax authority’s audit function under
consistency is scaled down by the relative tax rate differential compared to the same derivative







34. Hence, the right-hand side of (19) is always
smaller than the left-hand side and thus the internal transfer price is lower under consistency.
Expected Net Tax Revenues
Both tax authorities’ expected net tax revenues depend on the optimal quantity for a given arm’s
length price. Introducing the MNC’s equilibrium reporting policy into the tax authorities’ objective







































f (p)d p. (23)
PROPOSITION 7. a) The foreign tax authority benefits from consistent transfer pricing rules








τ f θ f
)
/qinc (sufficient condition).
b) The domestic tax authority benefits from inconsistent transfer pricing rules if τ f δ < (1−








∂q f (p)d p (sufficient condition).
Proof. Part a): see below; part b): see Appendix B.5.
34See also Proof of Proposition 6 a) in Appendix B.4.
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Figure 6 about here
Proposition 7 implies that implementing consistent tax transfer prices may be difficult because—in
terms of net tax revenues—situations are possible where the domestic country prefers inconsistency
while the foreign country benefits from consistency. As a consequence, if unanimity about the
introduction of transfer pricing regimes of both countries is required, consistency can often not be
agreed. Our analysis indicates that such disagreement can occur especially if the tax transfer pricing
systems are sufficiently similar (i. e., if δ is sufficiently small). Figure 6 provides a numerical
example of the development of domestic and foreign countries’ net tax revenue depending on δ .
In Figure 6 we see for the given numerical example for all δ < 20.3164 that the domestic country
benefits from inconsistency as E(Td)inc > E(Td)con. While we are able to show analytically that
δ < 9.2244 is sufficient for the domestic country to prefer inconsistency (δ in the shaded gray
interval), the numerical example clarifies that preference for inconsistency arises more often in the
domestic country than analytically predicted by the sufficient condition. Not only under very similar
transfer pricing regimes (δ < 9.2244) but also under loosely related regimes (δ < 20.3164) is the
domestic country better off under inconsistency. By contrast, under the given set of parameters, the
foreign country prefers a consistent transfer pricing regime for all δ , i. e., for all displayed levels of
similarity. Even though we are unable to derive a respective analytical solution for δ > 9.2244, the
numerical example highlights the relevance of such a scenario of disagreement between the two
countries.
As to the economic intuition, regard first the foreign tax authority (Equations (22) and (23)).
When introducing consistent transfer pricing rules, the foreign tax authority benefits from two effects.
First, tax revenues increase because of a higher quantity in the consistency setting (Proposition 6 a)).
Second, the foreign tax authority not only cuts down on its own audit costs but also gains tax on the
“overreport” which is determined by the domestic tax authority’s audit cost, the domestic penalty
rate, and the domestic tax rate (second term within the brackets in (23)). However, the foreign tax
authority can no longer install its own (generally higher) transfer pricing rules (δ > 0). The foreign
tax authority overall benefits from consistency if the positive effects outweigh the negative effects
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Figure 7 about here
for all p (sufficient condition, Proposition 7 a)).35 In particular, the foreign tax authority always
benefits from consistency if δ = 0.
For the domestic tax authority, the structure of the equilibrium tax revenues (20) does not change
after introducing consistent transfer pricing rules (21). The only variable that changes is the quantity
of production, which is higher in the consistency setting (Proposition 6 a)). The first term inside
the brackets of equation (21), R(q)− qp, is the tax base (revenue minus expenses) whereas the
second term measures the (fixed) losses due to profit shifting. Whether or not an increase in q is
beneficial for the domestic tax authority depends on the initial value of q, since R(q) is concave
whereas the expenses qp increase linearly. This can be explained graphically by regarding the tax
base R(q)−qp and marginal tax base (R′(q)− p) for an individual arm’s length price p, depending
on q (Figure 7). Since quantity is higher in the consistency setting it follows that the marginal tax
base is lower in this case. Also, we know that the marginal tax base for all p is negative under
consistency (see Appendix B.5, Equation 37). Thus, marginal expected net tax revenues are also
lower (for any given distribution f ). Since the marginal tax base is negative, we are in the decreasing
branch of the tax base curve (implying that a further increase in q reduces the tax authority’s tax
revenues. This situation is indicated by qcon(px) in Figure 7. If, for the inconsistency setting, the
expected marginal tax base is already zero or negative, a further increase in q (i. e., introducing
consistency) would definitely decrease domestic country’s net tax revenues (Proposition 7 b)). This
situation is indicated by qinc(p3). However, depending on the shape of the revenue function, the
distribution of arm’s length prices, and the dissimilarity between the tax transfer pricing systems δ ,
it is also possible that the marginal tax base is positive under inconsistency (indicated by qinc(p1)
and qinc(p2) in Figure 7), implying that the domestic tax authority may benefit from an increase in
q (i. e., from introducing consistency).
35A necessary and sufficient condition can be derived from comparing (22) and (23); however, since it depends on the
distribution of arm’s length prices, it does not allow for general insights.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
We study a setting with a multinational company with two divisions, one in the low-tax foreign
country (production of product) and one in the high-tax domestic country (sale of product). The
MNC is exclusively informed about the functions, assets, and risks profile which is fundamental
to the arm’s length price of its product. Based on this information, the MNC can choose a tax
transfer price report. Both tax authorities strategically determine audit probabilities, given the tax
transfer price documentation submitted by the MNC. We construct a separating equilibrium in
which the MNC’s tax transfer price report is a function of the arm’s length price and the audit
rates are functions of the tax transfer price reports. The MNC chooses its production quantity in
anticipation of the outcome of the tax audit.
Investigating a setting in which tax transfer pricing rules are inconsistent, we find that, in
equilibrium, tax avoidance emerges in both countries. Further, we find MNC’s production and profit
depend on the underlying FAR profile. It turns out that the MNC makes less profit if the foreign
division exhibits a hybrid FAR profile than in cases where entrepreneurial FAR are completely
assigned to either the foreign or the domestic division.
By contrast, under consistent tax transfer pricing regulation we find increases in MNC’s pro-
duction. Moreover, consistency prevents tax avoidance in the foreign country and reduces tax
avoidance in the domestic country. We find that MNC’s profit is highest if entrepreneurial FAR
are located entirely in the foreign division. Surprisingly, consistency is not always beneficial for
both tax authorities. Rather, we identify specific conditions under which the high-tax country
benefits from inconsistency while the low-tax country benefits from consistency, preventing an
unanimous implementation of consistent transfer pricing regimes; i. e., this applies if tax transfer
pricing systems are sufficiently similar. Finally, we establish a goal-congruent internal transfer
price which accounts for strategically acting tax authorities and show that inconsistency requires
the MNC to set a higher internal transfer price than under consistency.
Our contribution is threefold. First, we derive sufficient conditions for both inconsistency to be
beneficial from the viewpoint of the domestic country and for consistency to be beneficial from the
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viewpoint of the foreign country and identify settings of disagreement between the two countries on
the implementation of consistent regimes. Second, we show how an MNC’s profit depends on its
FAR profile under consistency and inconsistency. Finally, we show that the goal-congruent internal
transfer price is lower under consistent tax transfer pricing rules, implying that consistency in many
settings effectively attenuates frictions that arise if tax effects are not taken into account in internal
transfer prices.
Our findings suggest that successfully installing consistent tax transfer pricing rules is likely
more successful between countries with tax transfer pricing regulations that are relatively similar.
Furthermore, while under both inconsistency and consistency, those MNCs whose entrepreneurial
FAR are bundled at the foreign country come off best in terms of profit, we find that with inconsis-
tency, locating the entrepreneurial FAR in the domestic country can be second best. By contrast,
when introducing consistency, bundling the entrepreneurial FAR in the domestic country is always
worst. This suggests that consistent tax transfer pricing systems may create an incentive for MNCs
to move entrepreneurial FAR out of the domestic country. On the other hand, consistency eliminates
the pressure towards extreme FAR allocations that come with inconsistency. Ongoing legislative
initiatives such as Information Exchange Agreements and Country by Country Reporting combined
with technological innovations such as blockchain, which are all deemed to ensure consistency via
enhanced transparency through standardized or simplified information sharing, clearly represent
a trend towards the consistency setting. While this is desirable with regard to preventing double
taxation and undertaxation and in turn to ensuring the ability-to-pay approach, decision makers
should be aware of its side effects and be prepared to take counter measures. Future research should
extend extant models with strategic taxpayer and tax authority behavior with respect to measures of
enhanced transparency, endogenize MNC’s FAR allocation decision, and test the derived predictions
empirically with respect to occurrence and economic significance.
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APPENDIX
A. EVIDENCE ON TAX TRANSFER PRICING INCONSISTENCY
A.1. Anecdotal Evidence from an Online Survey
To collect anecdotal evidence on when different transfer prices occur, we performed an online survey.
We asked participants whether they anticipate the problem and already report different transfer
prices in their tax returns, or whether they rather experience deviations as a result of a tax audit.
The survey was distributed via the Transfer Pricing working group of the German Consortium for
Economic Management (Arbeitsgemeinschaft für wirtschaftliche Verwaltung e.V., AWV) and the
Tax Committee of the German Chemical Industry Association (Verband der Chemischen Industrie
e.V., VCI). The survey ran from Dec. 10, 2020 to Jan. 20, 2021. The invitation was sent to around
60 transfer pricing experts in German multinational companies. While it is not representative, it
does fulfill our aim of reaching highly qualified and specialized experts who hold relevant decision-
making positions in the companies. More than two thirds (70%) of participants have a master’s
degree (or equivalent) and more than a quarter (26%) hold a doctorate. 83% have worked in transfer
pricing for more than ten years.
Table 1 shows the number of participants, excluded observations, and demographics of the sample
participants.
Table 1 about here
We asked participants to indicate how often they witnessed different transfer pricing regulations
being used when filing the tax return (Table 2). 43.5% state that they have experienced different tax
transfer prices occasionally or more frequently. By contrast, all participants have experienced trans-
fer pricing inconsistencies as a result of an audit; 87% say they have experienced this (very) often.
Also, double taxation seems a common consequence of different tax transfer prices. Undertaxation,
by contrast, is experienced rarely.36
36Note, however, that representatives of MNCs may be reluctant to indicate that undertaxation occurs.
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Table 2 about here
According to the participants, double taxation can be avoided in many – but by no means all –
cases by means of a mutual agreement procedure (Table 3).
Table 3 about here
Finally, participants observed a (strong) increase in double taxation as a result of different transfer
pricing in the last five years. Moreover, they expect a further increase in transfer pricing-induced
double taxation issue in the next five years. Participants neither observed nor expect a “decrease” or
”strong decrease” (Table 4).
Figure 4 about here
A.2. Anecdotal evidence from semi-structured interviews
Given our interest in tax practitioners’ view on the relevance of inconsistent transfer prices, we
chose to conduct a few semi-structured interviews to accompany our theoretical findings. We
prepared specific questions but the interviewees were free to deviate from these during the course of
the interview to pursue any upcoming interesting ideas, returning to the planned interview questions
after a while. This semi-structured approach allowed us to obtain a comprehensive overview. We
found that it encouraged interviewees to further contextualize their responses. This open form
generated some differences in topics across the interviews, including a variety of follow-up questions
from the interviewer. As the purpose of these interviews was to collect some anecdotal evidence we
had anticipated and indeed found that this was a very fruitful way to obtain a deeper insight into
experienced tax managers’ reasoning on this topic.
We asked the interviewees to agree to an interview on transfer pricing, respective audits, and
transfer pricing inconsistencies so we could obtain some practitioners’ views on the topic. The
interviewees were asked to commit to a 30-minute time slot, yet most interviews were approximately
35 minutes in length, while one took 95 minutes. All were conducted by the same author by
telephone. We did not share the prepared questions upfront. The interviewees were told that their
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Table 5 about here
responses would be confidential and that neither their name nor their company’s or institution’s name
nor any other identifying information would be published. Given the specificity of the responses we
received, we believe the interviewees were very candid.
We conducted six interviews. All interviewees are experienced German experts in transfer pricing,
working either for multinationals or consultancies (DAX30-listed or Big4 companies) or as tax
officers in the German Federal Central Tax Office. All of them have occupied their positions and
dealt with transfer pricing issues for many years.
Table 5 summarizes the respective quotes and displays them by topic.
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B. PROOFS
B.1. Proof of Propositions 1 and 2
The proof of Propositions 1 and 2 is similar to that presented by Reinganum et al. (1986a, p. 750) in
the case of linear audit costs. Based on this separating equilibrium (in the second stage) we study
the MNC’s quantity decision and choice of internal transfer price (in the first stage).
The tax authorities’ first-order conditions with linear audit costs ki(ai(ti)) = biai(ti) are given by
∂Td
∂ad(td)
= τdθdq(td−µd(td))−bd = 0, (24)
∂Tf
∂a f (t f )
= τ f θ f q(µ f (t f )− t f )−b f = 0, (25)
and headquarters’ first-order conditions with respect to profit-maximizing tax transfer prices in the
domestic and the foreign country are given by
∂Π
∂ td
=−qθdτd (td− pd)a′d (td)−qθdτdad (td)+qτd = 0, (26)
∂Π
∂ t f
=−qθ f τ f
(










−qτ f = 0. (27)
A separating equilibrium is found by obtaining pi = ri−1(ti) = µi(ti) from (24) and (25). Inserting
pi = µi(ti) into (26) and (27) one obtains two differential equations which can be solved to obtain
the audit functions depicted in Propositions 1 and 2. The differential equations are determined by
the boundary conditions ad(td) = 0 and a f (t f ) = 0. These boundary conditions are justified by the
domestic (foreign) tax authority’s belief that any report td < td (t f > t f ) comes from type pd (p f ).
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The MNC’s second-order conditions are given by
∂ 2Π
∂ t2d









=−qθ f τ f
(
p f − t f
)









q2θ f τ2f e
−




(note that, in the second step, ti = ri(pi) was used).
Low transfer price reports td ≤ td lead the domestic tax authority to believe that pd is on hand.
Thus, ∂
∂ad
Td(td,ad, pd) = τdθdq(td− pd)−bd ≤ 0 and, hence, ad(td) = 0. For high reports td > td
we have µd(td) = pd , thus, ∂∂ad Td(td,ad, pd) = τdθq(td− pd)−bd > 0, which implies ad(td) = 1.
For td < td < td the tax authority is indifferent since ∂∂ad Td(td,ad,rd(pd)) = 0, a f (t f ) is thus a best
reply.
Any report t†d > td is dominated by td since
∂
∂ t†d
Π(t†d , t f ,a
inc
d ,a f ) = τdq(1−θd) < 0. Similarly,
reporting t‡d < td is dominated by td since
∂
∂ t‡d
Π(t‡d , t f ,a
inc
d ,a f ) = τdq > 0. Reporting rd(pd) for
td < td < td satisfies (26).
For high reported transfer prices t f ≥ t f the foreign tax authority believes µ f (t f ) = p f . It will thus
audit with probability zero: ∂
∂a f
Tf (t f ,a f , p f ) = τ f θ f q(p f − t f )−b f ≤ 0, and, hence, a f (t f ) = 0.
For low reported transfer prices t f < t f we have ∂∂a f Tf (t f ,a f , p f ) = τ f θ f q(p f − t f )−b f > 0, and,
hence, a f (t f ) = 1.







f ) = τ f q(θ f − f )> 0, and all reports







f ) =−qτ f < 0, while reporting r f (p f ) satisfies
the first-order condition(26).
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B.2. Proof of Proposition 3




τd−bd ∂ 2aincd∂q∂ pd︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡A
−τ f −b f
∂ 2aincf

































and SOC given by (11).
i. For pd = pd one has
∂ 2ad
∂q∂ pd
= τdbd , and, therefore, A = 0.
ii. For pd = pd +
bd
qθdτd
the cross partial derivative vanishes and one obtains A = τd . If
pd > pd +
bd
qθdτd
, the cross partial derivative takes negative values, and, therefore, A > 0.





. In this region, both the exponential function and the factor in brackets
take values between zero and one. Hence, A > 0.
The procedure regarding B is analogous. For pd = pd , B = 0; for pd = pd−
b f
qθ f τ f
, the cross
partial derivative is zero and B =−τ f ; and, for pd < pd−
b f
qθ f τ f
the cross partial derivative is




qθ f τ f
, pd
)
the absolute value of the cross partial
derivative is smaller than τ fb f , thus, B is also negative. Hence, we know that the A is always
non-negative, and B is always non-positive. Furthermore, we know that
for pd = pd , A = 0 B < 0;
for pd = pd , A > 0 B = 0.
Therefore, ∂q
inc
∂ p is negative for pd close to pd and positive for pd close to pd .
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. Making use of the
envelope theorem, the condition for an extremum ∂V
inc
∂ p = 0 gives q



















qincτ f θ f
b f
delivers
the equation stated in Proposition 3. Furthermore,
∂ 2Πinc(qinc(p);p,δ)










, where subscripts denote partial derivatives. From
the first-order condition we know that Πincq
∣∣
q=qinc = 0; implicitly differentiating the first-











. If the second-order condition (11) holds, Πincqq < 0, hence, the second term is










qθ f τ f (p−p)
b f > 0. Hence, V inc(p,δ )
























c) Again using the envelope theorem, ∂V
inc(p,δ )
∂δ
=−qincτ f < 0, which proves part c) of Proposi-
tion 3, regarding the MNC’s profit. Regarding optimal quantity, implicitly differentiating (9)
with respect to δ yields ∂q
inc
∂δ
=−τ f (−SOC)< 0.
B.3. Proof of Proposition 5



















Evidently, the denominator is non-negative if the second-order condition (18) is fulfilled (and
thus S is nonpositive).
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i. For p = p one has aqp =
τd−τ f
b , and, therefore,
∂qcon
∂ p = 0.
ii. For p = p+ bqθτd the cross partial derivative vanishes and one obtains
∂qcon
∂ p = (τd −
τ f )(−SOC)−1 > 0. If p > p+ bqθτd , the cross partial derivative takes negative values,
and, therefore, ∂q
con
∂ p is positive.




, both the exponential function in aconqp and the factor in
brackets take values between zero and one. Therefore, the cross partial derivative is
smaller than τd−τ fb , and
∂qcon
∂ p is positive.
This proves Proposition 5 a).
b) Define the value function V con(p) = Πcon(qcon(p); p). Applying the envelope theorem, one
obtains dV
con
d p = q
con (τd− τ f )(1− e− θqτd (p−p)b ) > 0, which implies that V con(p) is maxi-
mized at the boundary p = p. From the proof of Part b) of Proposition 3 we know that
d2Πcon






, the second term of which is always positive if the second-order con-





b2 < 0. Thus,
V con(p) is convex in p.
B.4. Proof of Proposition 6 a)
Implicitly differentiating (9) with respect to δ gives ∂q
inc
∂δ
=− τ fSOC (note that the audit function of
the foreign tax authority does not directly depend on δ ). Thus, production decreases with generally
increasing higher arm’s length prices in the foreign country. Therefore, it suffices to show that
consistency increases production for δ = 0. First, notice from Propositions 1 and 4 (and by taking













where acon denotes the domestic tax authority’s audit probability in the consistency setting whereas
aincd denotes its audit probability in the inconsistency setting. Given δ = 0, the MNC’s first-order
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conditions with respect to the quantity in the two settings, (9) and (15), can be written as














where Λ(q) ≡ (1− τd)R′(q)− c+ τd p− τ f (p− c) decreases in q. The derivatives of the audit
functions also decrease in q, however, if the second-order condition holds, they fall at a lower
rate.37 Assume q† solves the first-order condition for the consistency setting. Apparently, given
q†, the right-hand side of (33) is lower than the right-hand side of (32) (q† does not solve (32), the
right-hand side is too high). Starting from q†, as q decreases, both the right-hand and left-hand side
of (32) increase, however the left-hand side increases at a higher rate until eventually Equation (32)
is satisfied at some q‡ < q†. Starting again from q†, if q increases, both the right-hand and left-hand
side of (32) decrease, however, the left-hand side decreases faster. As the right-hand side is already
too high at p = p†, there can be no q > q† that solves Equation (32). Hence, the optimal quantity
must be lower with inconsistent transfer pricing rules for δ = 0. As shown above, for δ > 0 quantity
is even lower in the inconsistency setting.
B.5. Proof of Proposition 7 b)
One way to derive the statement in Proposition 7 b) is to study the volume of production that the
domestic tax authority would prefer. If the domestic tax authority could determine the MNC’s







R′(qs) f (p)d p = E(p), (34)
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where E(p) is the expected arm’s length price. However, the MNC chooses q according to the
first-order conditions (9, inconsistency) or (15, consistency). Therefore, the MNC is expected to
choose quantity according to
∫ p
p
R′(q) f (p)d p =
∫ p
p






f (p)d p︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡A
, (35)
for the inconsistency setting, and according to
∫ p
p
R′(q) f (p)d p =
∫ p
p




f (p)d p,︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡B
(36)
for the consistency setting.
From Proposition 6 a) (quantity is higher in the consistency setting) it follows that the term inside
the integral of B is smaller then the term inside the integral of A. As this is true ∀p, it follows that
B < A. As R′(q) decreases in q, the domestic tax authority benefits from consistency (which implies
a higher quantity) if
1) E(p)< B < A,
and it benefits from inconsistency (which implies a lower quantity) if
2) E(p)> A > B.














bd f (p)d p. (37)
Inequality (37) is always fulfilled since the exponential term is not greater than one for all p, and,
by assumption, c≤ p.
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However, it can also be that A > E(p) > B. In this case, whether or not the domestic country
benefits from consistency depends on the distribution of arm’s length prices and on the shape of the
revenue function and is, therefore, not distinct. A necessary condition that the domestic country does
not benefit from consistency is given by E(p)> A, which gives the condition stated in Proposition
7 b).
C. INCONSISTENT AND INDEPENDENT ARM’S LENGTH PRICES
If the arm’s length prices pd and p f in both countries are completely independent, one obtains the
following results.
PROPOSITION 8. If transfer pricing rules are inconsistent and uncorrelated, the optimal quantity
increases in the domestic arm’s length price and decreases in the foreign arm’s length price.
Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof of Proposition 3 a) (see Appendix B.2).
























and SOC given by (11).
i. For pd = pd one has
∂ 2ad
∂q∂ pd




ii. For pd = pd +
bd
qθdτd














. In this region, both the exponential function and the factor in brackets
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The proof is analogous to part a). For p f = p f ,
∂qinc
∂ p f
is zero; for p f = p f −
b f
qθ f τ f
, the cross
partial derivative is zero and ∂q
inc
∂ p f
=−τ f (−SOC)−1; and, for p f < p f −
b f
qθ f τ f
the cross partial
derivative is positive, making ∂q
inc
∂ p f




qθ f τ f
)
the absolute value of the




The intuition behind this result is as follows. High arm’s length prices in the domestic country
allow the MNC to make higher transfer price reports there, resulting in lower tax payments. These
constant marginal tax savings equate to the domestic tax rate, τd . The profit shifted to the foreign
country has no effect: since the amount is constant, it does not enter the MNC’s calculus. Then,
lower taxes increase the optimal amount of production. There is a secondary effect, however, since
more production comes at the cost of a marginally increasing audit probability (cf. Lemma 1). For
pd > pd +
bd
qθdτd
, this marginal audit probability in turn decreases with higher arm’s length prices.
Overall, the linearly increasing tax savings that come with higher arm’s length prices dominate.
Analoguous reasoning applies to the arm’s length price in the foreign country. There, taxes are
lower with lower arm’s length prices, which increases production.
PROPOSITION 9. If transfer pricing rules are inconsistent and uncorrelated, the MNC’s profit
generated in equilibrium increases in the domestic arm’s length price and decreases in the foreign
arm’s length price.
Proof. Define the value function V inc(pd, p f ) ≡ Πinc
(
qinc(pd, p f ); pd, p f
)
. Making use of the
envelope theorem, one obtains ∂V
inc(pd ,p f )
∂ pd
= qincτdθdaincd > 0 and
∂V inc(pd ,p f )
∂ p f
= −qincτ f θ f aincf <
0.
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Intuitively, the MNC profits from higher domestic arm’s length prices and lower foreign arm’s
length prices. In an “honesty” setting without audits, the MNC’s increase (decrease) in profit from
a marginal increase in the domestic (foreign) arm’s length price would be equal to qincτp (qincτ f ).
In our setting, this marginal profit is lower due to the tax authorities’ audit activities, but it is still
positive (negative).
D. PARTIALLY ENDOGENOUS ARM’S LENGTH PRICES
If the arm’s length price is located somewhere between the marginal costs of production c and the
revenue R(q), it (also) depends on the endogenous variable q. Assume pd = (1− γd)c+ γdR(q)/q,
where γd measures the foreign division’s (exogenously given) degree of entrepreneurship (according
to the domestic transfer pricing rules; γd = 1→ entrepreneur; γd = 0→ toll manufacturer). We only
stylize the modeling partially endogenous arm’s length prices. Replacing pd by (1−γd)c+γdR(q)/q




(note that the overreported amount is identical to our above model). Solving for γd , together with the
multinational’s first-order condition and the boundary condition ad(td) = 0, one obtains a differential







, which is identical to the equation presented
in Proposition 1 iff pd = c. The procedure is analogous for the foreign transfer pricing report and
for the case of consistent transfer pricing regimes.
E. A NOTE ON POOLING EQUILIBRIA
Reinganum et al. (1986b) have shown how the universally divine equilibrium concept introduced
by Banks et al. (1987) can rule out pooling equilibria in their settlement game. Below, we show
the procedure for the case with consistent transfer pricing rules, however, the idea is similar for the
inconsistency case.
Consider a (fully) pooling equilibrium where all MNCs report t̂ and are audited with probability
zero. This requires that t̂ ≥ p because otherwise all types t̂ ≤ p < p would prefer reporting p over
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reporting t̂. Also, it requires that




because, otherwise, the tax authority would prefer to audit with probability 1. In total, it is required
that p≤ t̂ ≤ E(p)+ b
τdθq
.
First, consider the following pooling equilibrium:
• All MNC types report the same t̂ = E(p)+ b
τdθq
;
• the tax authority’s equilibrium and out-of-equilibrium beliefs are given by µ(p|t) = E(p);
• The tax authority audits with probability z =

1, t > t̂





[z(τd(R(q)− tq)+ τdθ(t−E(p))q−b)+(1− z)(τd(R(q)− tq))]
= τd(R(q)− tq)+ τdθ(t−E(p))q−b− τd(R(q)− tq)≷ 0




the tax authority will audit all reports t > t̂ with probability 1, while all reports t < t̂ are never
audited. As a best response, all MNCs will report t̂.
Second, there is a class of pooling equilibria where
• all MNC types report the same t̂ < E(p)+ b
τdθq
;
• the tax authority’s equilibrium and out-of-equilibrium beliefs are given by

µ(p|t) = E(p), t ≤ t̂
µ(p|t)≤ t− b
τdθq
, t > t̂
;
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• The tax authority audits with probability z =

1, t > t̂
0, t ≤ t̂
.
Now, consider some pooling equilibrium t̂ and a deviating report t? > t̂. The MNC of type p is
indifferent between reporting t̂ and t? if the tax authority audits with probability z(p; t?) such that
qt̂(τd− τ f ) = qt?(τd− τ f )− z(p; t?)θqτd(t?− p)
⇐⇒ z(p; t?) =
(t?− t̂)(τd− τ f )
τdθ(t?− p)
.
Since z′(p; t?) = (t
?−t̂)(τd−τ f )
(t?−p)2θτd
> 0, when reporting t?, the MNC of type p is associated with the
highest audit probability. Reciprocally, this means that p is the type most likely to deviate to t?. The
universal divinity criterion requires that the tax authority beliefs that the out-of-equilibrium report
t? comes from the type most likely to deviate, i. e., p; formally, µ(p|t?) = p. Given this belief, the
tax authority’s best response is to audit a report t? with probability zero:
d
dz
[z(τd(R(q)− t?q)+ τdθ(t?− p)q−b)+(1− z)(τd(R(q)− t?q))]
= τd(R(q)− t?q)+ τdθ(t?− p)q−b− τd(R(q)− t?q)< 0
⇐⇒ t? < p+ b
τdθq
.
This implies that type p always prefers to report t? over reporting t̂. Hence, t̂ is not supported by the
out-of-equilibrium belief µ(p|t?) = p, and, therefore, is not universally divine.
There also exist partially pooling equilibria such that there is some pooling point ť, p < ť < p,
with all types p ≤ p̌ report ť (and all other types stick to the separating equilibrium). Similar
reasoning applies to these partially pooling equilibria. Universal divinity requires that the tax
authority believes that any deviating report comes from the MNC most likely to deviate (which is
p̌). But then the tax authority would choose not to audit this deviating report. Therefore, type p̌
would prefer to deviate.
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Note: A high (low) degree of entrepreneurship determines an arm’s length price close to pi (pi). The arm’s
length price lies in the middle of the interval if the foreign division exhibits routine as well as entrepreneurial
functions.
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Note: First, the multinational’s headquarters sets the incentive transfer price. The domestic division then decides on the
quantity to be sold in the domestic market. The determination of the optimal quantity is referred to as stage one. Second,
headquarters sets the tax transfer price and submits an income report alongside with a transfer pricing documentation,
which informs the tax authorities about the (reported) functional profile (i. e., td = rd(pd) and t f = r f (p f )) and quantity
q. Subsequently, both tax authorities decide about the audit probability. This process is referred to as stage two. Any
penalties are then divided between the domestic division and headquarters according to ν . For simplicity, we only
depict the “excess payoffs” that are directly determined by the tax authorities’ audit decisions.
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Note: The black solid (dashed) line depicts the domestic (foreign) tax authority’s audit function under inconsistency.
The gray solid line depicts the domestic tax authority’s audit function for the consistency setting (see Section IV).
56
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3895611













Note: δ is set to zero. The black (gray) lines depict the setting with inconsistent (consistent) transfer pricing rules
(Section IV).
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Figure 6: Domestic country’s expected net tax revenue under inconsistency and consistency: nu-
merical example























Domestic country benefits from inconsistency
Note: The graph numerically exemplifies the following setting: τd = .4,τ f = .35,c = 1,θd = θ f = 2,bd = b f =
2, f (p) = 1/(p− p) with p = 12, p = 2,R(q) = q(k− lq/2) with k = 32, l = 5. With these parameters, the sufficient
condition shown in Proposition 7 b) is given by δ < 9.2244. Hence, for δ < 9.2244 we are able to show analytically
that the domestic country benefits from inconsistency (δ in the shaded gray interval). However, the numerical example
clarifies that also for higher values of δ the domestic country benefits from inconsistency as E(Td)inc > E(Td)con. As
illustrated, under the given set of parameters, the domestic country prefers inconsistency for δ < 20.3164, while the
foreign country prefers consistency throughout the entire plotted domain.
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Figure 7: Tax base (black line) and marginal tax base (gray line), depending on the quantity q, for a
linear demand function















Note: Given p1 and p2, the domestic country may benefit from consistency; given p3, the domestic country benefits
from inconsistency. px indicates an an arbitrary arm’s length price; under consistency, the marginal tax base is negative
for all arm’s length prices.
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Table 1: Number of participants and demographics
Number of participants 45
Excluded (survey not completed) 22
Resulting sample 23
Years worked in transfer pricing <5 5–10 10–15 >15
1 3 7 12
Highest degree Bachelor* Master* PhD*
1 16 6
Note: The non-representative online survey ran from Dec. 10, 2020 to Jan. 20,
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Table 2: Experience with inconsistent tax transfer prices.
Very often Often Occasionally Seldom Never
Inconsistent tax transfer prices were . . .
. . . reported 4.3 % .0 % 39.1 % 34.8 % 21.7 %
. . . result of an audit 30.4 % 56.5 % 13 % .0 % .0 %
Inconsistent tax transfer prices led to . . .
. . . double taxation 19.0 % 47.6 % 23.8 % 9.5 % .0 %
. . . undertaxation .0 % 4.8 % 9.5 % 23.8 % 61.9 %
If the sets of feasible domestic and foreign tax transfer prices intersect . . .
. . . a single price is chosen 43.5 % 21.7 % 26.1 % 4.3 % 4.3 %
. . . different prices are chosen 8.7 % 4.3 % 8.7 % 30.4 % 47.8 %
If the sets of feasible domestic and foreign tax transfer prices are disjunct . . .
. . . a single price is chosen 7.2 % 18.8 % 29.0 % 20.3 % 24.6 %
. . . different prices are chosen 4.3 % 8.7 % 17.4 % 26.1 % 43.5 %
Note: The table shows percentage shares of a total of 23 answers, with the exception of the question on the
effects (double taxation, undertaxation), where we have a total of 21 answers. Regarding questions 3 and 4,
participants were provided two examples. To simulate a situation with intersecting sets, the range of acceptable
arm’s length prices was 2–4 from a domestic perspective and 3–5 from a foreign perspective (possible answers:
“4 in both countries”; “4 in Germany, 3 in the foreign country”). In the situation with disjunct sets, the range of
acceptable arm’s length prices was 2–4 from a domestic perspective and 6–8 from a foreign perspective (possible
answers: “4 in both countries”, “5 in both countries”, “6 in both countries”, “4 in Germany, 6 in the foreign
country”). Participants were then asked to choose what price would be employed in the domestic and foreign
country, respectively. Participants were not provided with tax rates and the direction of the transaction.
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Table 3: Experience with mutual agreement procedures.
Always Very often Often Occasionally Seldom Never
Double taxation was avoided by means of a mutual agreement procedure
10.0 % 20.0 % 20.0 % 30.0 % 10.0 % 10.0 %
Note: The table shows percentage shares of a total of 20 answers.
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Assessment of the development over time of the problem of double
taxation
Past five years 35.0 % 60.0 % 5.0 % .0 % .0 %
Next five years 61.9 % 28.6 % 9.5 % .0 % .0 %
Note: The table shows percentage shares of a total of 20 answers (past five years) and 21
answers (next five years).
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Table 5: Interviewees’ quotes by topic
Question / topic Topic-specific responses of six tax transfer pricing experts of major German multinational




Are there any country
combinations for which
you/taxpayers expect
that the tax authorities
will have different ideas
about the level of





MNCs / Tax Advisory Companies
Well, the issue doesn’t start in the documentation, but in the pricing. And that is simply a very
difficult issue. There are already some large corporations . . . that say, for example, Brazil, there
are simply unilateral regulations that prevent you from charging a license for certain things.
. . . that is actually what many people do, [they] wait and see what will happen during the audit;
but inconsistent pricing is dangerous in that you ultimately lose credibility in any other country.
The answer is that a number of taxpayers differentiate and set a different transfer price in
anticipation of a discussion during the tax audit.
In other words, we are applying different transfer prices for the same business model and are
thus responding to the differences in the local tax audits.
We have said that transfer pricing is not an exact science, we have a bandwidth and we have
some space to move around within that bandwidth.
It’s actually always the BRICS countries, plus countries like Italy.
Italy, Brazil are certainly such countries. China, too. Especially when it comes to something
like licenses, for example.
You have already mentioned Brazil. In fact, there is no other way, because there is no double
taxation agreement and because of the very specific regulations there is no other way to handle
it.
Tax Administration
Of course, they now have room to maneuver and they assess individual countries differently. I








transfer prices for a
particular product or
service as a result of an
audit?
MNCs / Tax Advisory Companies
But now you have to realize that there are a few countries that always prefer to pursue their
own approach, they are the usual suspects, namely China and India when it comes to service
billing. So, in India no one manages to push through their normal transfer pricing system with
the normal markup. At least, I don’t know of anyone who can do it. It’s [the markup is] much
higher than almost anywhere else.
And what I’m also noticing at the moment, so besides countries, that are the usual suspects,
Brazil, Argentina and co., is Russia strangely enough.
In principle, this can happen in all country combinations. I’ve seen it happen in all country
combinations, and it always depends very much on the facts of the case, and you can’t put it
down to a specific transaction; it’s simply because transfer prices are not black or white, but
gray, so to say.
I think all country combinations are possible now. It’s more a question of materiality, whether
you then say you’re going to take this a step further. So we see many issues in Eastern Europe,
because the tax authorities there take a very formalistic approach.
So that also has nothing to do with what is an OECD country or not. This is an issue for all tax
authorities.
Well, Brazil is a special case, they have different regulations anyway.
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Tax Administration









pricing method (e. g.,
different markup for







of the role of the
market in the context
of the location of
value creation?
• Other?
MNCs / Tax Advisory Companies
Unfortunately it is not possible to trace it back to one thing. It starts when they develop an
appetite, they poke around everywhere, then they want to see the function and risk profile a
little differently and question that.
. . . you practically have to choose between a rock and a hard place; then you have a problem in
Italy if you include the three percent, because the Italians then say, listen, you know very well
that we don’t recognize that. ... If you then say, if you cave in on the advance payment, and
Italy actually only charges two percent, then you have problems in Germany, because from the
point of view of the German auditor, you are foregoing one percent royalty income from Italy
for reasons of proximity, and you are doing that on purpose again. And this takes us back to
this issue of criminal law, and the German auditor will always say that you have to proactively
show this, you voluntarily include this one percent as income in your tax return, even though
you didn’t receive it.
[Europe:] . . . this is rather about technical details, such as the database studies that are used,
for example, to determine the profitability that third parties could determine or achieve. The
Eastern European countries are very formalistic in this respect.
Tax Administration
So, if you look at transfer pricing documentation and specifically at the decisive points, namely
functions and risks, you often only have pages of checkboxes where certain functions are listed
and then you have three crosses, four crosses, five crosses. But the other company only has two
crosses or one cross. This is sometimes handled differently and what is then lacking is really
the facts on both sides. What are really the functions and risks that are performed by the two
companies? And if I only see one side of things, that’s often not enough.
And then, of course, there is always the tendency of every financial administration to pull in as
much as possible into their own country. This means that we often do not have a solution to the
double taxation cases and therefore have to carry out a mutual agreement procedure.
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